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A. Introduction
17.01 Access to medical treatments and medicinal products, the availability of new 
diagnostic tools, and the future direction of biomedical research are all 
profoundly influenced by the existence and exercise of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs). The philosophy of the intellectual property regime is 
disarmingly simple: the promise of a private property right to control the 
exploitation of a new creation—be it a drug, an artistic work or the design of a 
new article of commerce—encourages others to create and make their 
creations available to the community, all in the name of the public good. The 
reward to the innovator is a monopoly right, limited in time, to exclude 
competitors from the marketplace. The strength of the monopoly varies 
depending on the particular intellectual property right in question. Thus, for 
example, copyright only prevents direct copying of the work that is protected, 
whereas patent protection confers an absolute monopoly of the market making 
it possible to exclude even the innocent infringer who has independently and 
unknowingly invented the same product. Compensation for this uneven 
breadth of protection between these IPRs is reflected in the duration of the 
respective rights. Strong patent protection lasts a maximum of 20 years,1 while
weaker copyright in original works subsists for the life of the author and 70 
years post mortem auctoris. It is clear from this that intellectual property law 
is about seeking a balance between a range of potentially competing interests. 
A host of tensions abound. On the one hand, there is the need to regulate 
competing private interests between property rights holders and other 
entrepreneurs who may, as a result, be excluded from the market. This in turn 
has consequences for the public interest lest excessive monopolistic control 
reduces consumer choice and services. Relatedly, there is the perennial 
problem of striking an acceptable balance between the offer of attractive and 
effective IPRs and the restriction on the grant and exercise of those rights 
when protection of them no longer serves the public good. Nowhere is the 
tension felt more acutely than in the realm of patent law, and it is this area of 
intellectual property law that impacts most directly on the provision of health 
                                                          
1 Supplementary Protection Certificates are available in various jurisdictions for pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemicals to extend the protection period by up to five years. The rationale is that such inventions 
are delayed in reaching the market because of stringent safety regulations and so the actual time 
afforded to patentees to exploit their inventions is reduced. In Europe, see Council Regulations 1768/92 
of 18 June 1992 (pharmaceuticals) and 1610/96 of 23 July 1996 (agrochemicals).
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care and the carrying out of medical research.
17.02 This Chapter considers the current state of play regarding the influence on 
medical law of patent law and patent rights. Much recent debate has focused 
on the patentability of biotechnological inventions, most notably genes and 
gene fragments, and on the impact of aggressive patenting policies on research 
and the availability of diagnostic tests and therapies. Objections to patenting in 
the medical sphere have been directed to both (i) absolute grounds of 
objection, ie arguing that certain inventions should not be patentable at all, and 
(ii) relative grounds of objection, ie arguing that medical patents should not be 
exploited in a particular manner—the objection to the latter being that the 
exercise of the monopoly is unacceptable relative to other social values, such 
as access to medicines and health care. The structure of this chapter reflects 
these themes. Consideration is also given to the role and rights of research 
subjects or patients when their active participation in research has led to a 
patentable invention.
B. Obtaining and Exploiting a Patent
17.03 Although a range of IPRs is relevant to many aspects of a health service,2
patents undoubtedly have the most direct and enduring effect on the provision 
of health care and the enterprise of medical research.
1. Patentability Criteria
17.04 Patents protect inventions. Invention is not defined in the law; 3rather a patent 
will be granted if a prospective patentee can overcome three significant 
hurdles. First, the putative invention must not be excluded from protection 
according to a defined list of non-patentable entities; most particularly the 
invention must not be a mere discovery.4 Second, a patent shall not be granted 
‘for an invention the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 
public policy or morality’.5 Finally, the invention must meet a stringent set of 
positive criteria for patentability, namely, that the invention must be new (in 
the sense of never before having been made available to the public),6 it must 
involve an inventive step (ie, that the invention does not merely represent an 
obvious technical development to an expert in the relevant field),7 and it 
should be capable of industrial application (ie, it can be made or used in any 
kind of industry).8
                                                          
2 For example, copyright subsists in all notes, records, photographs, x-rays, prescriptions and charts 
because these are protected as literary or artistic works under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988, ss 3–4. Similarly, the design of many instruments or other pieces of equipment might be the 
subject of design rights under the Registered Designs Act 1949 or the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1998, Pt III, while the Trade Marks Act 1994 is the legal basis for the grant of UK trade mark 
rights, the existence of which is responsible for the maintenance of high prices on drugs to which a 
successful mark is attached. Indeed, it is a universal intellectual property policy of pharmaceutical 
companies to ensure that drugs are marketed under a distinctive trade mark long before any patent 
protection runs out. Once this occurs, after 20 years, the market share is defended by the enduring 
appeal of the trade mark, even although the drug itself is now available for any competitor to produce 
in the generics market. Further trade mark disputes affect the pricing and availability of drugs through 
regulation of the practice of parallel importing, see for example, Case C-143/00 Boehringer Ingleheim 
KG v Swingward Ltd (joined actions); Glaxo Group Ltd v Dowelhurst Ltd [2002] 3 WLR 1697, 65 
BMLR 177.
3 Patents Act 1977.
4 ibid, s 1(2)(a).
5 ibid, s 1(3).
6 ibid, s 1(1)(a).
7 ibid, s 1(1)(b).
8 ibid, s 1(1)(c).
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2. Exclusions of Methods of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis
17.05 Writ large in these provisions is the role of public policy. In essence, patents 
should only be granted to worthy inventions that are not already available, 
which add substantial value to the sum total of human knowledge, and which 
do not offend public sensibilities. The letter of the law pays particular 
attention to policy concerns surrounding equitable access to health care. For 
example, s 4(2) of the Patents Act 1977 provides that:
An invention of a method of treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy or of diagnosis practised on the human or animal body 
shall not be taken to be capable of industrial application.
Various practices have been denied patent protection on these grounds, 
including a method for operating and monitoring heart pacemakers,9 improved 
dosage regimes of established treatments,10 and a method for vaccination 
against disease.11 The rationale is that those who practise the public good of 
medicine should not be hindered in their art because of the potential 
inaccessibility of new and improved treatment methods through the obduracy 
of a patent holder.12 This rationale, however, does not extend as broadly as 
logic might suggest. It should be noted, for example, that the exclusion only 
extends to methods of treatment of the human or animal body. Thus, anything 
done to, or created from, samples derived from the body is patentable, so long 
as the substances are not to be returned to the same body.13 Likewise, if the 
method does not involve treatment of the human or animal body—in the sense 
of having a curative or prophylactic effect on a disease or malfunctioning of 
the body—then it is patentable. An example would be the administration of a 
chemical product for purely cosmetic reasons.14 It has also been established, 
inter alia, that pregnancy15 and infestation by lice16 are not diseases as such, 
and methods for their treatment have accordingly been patented. As the Court 
of Appeal has confirmed: ‘[t]he section has the limited purpose of ensuring 
that the actual use, by practitioners, of methods of medical treatment when 
treating patients should not be subject to restraint or restriction by patent 
monopolies. The difficulty is to decide whether the restraint concerns a 
method of treatment as opposed to what is available for treatment.’17
17.06 Section 4(3) of the 1977 Act ensures that ‘what is available for treatment’ can 
also be protected:
Subsection (2) … shall not prevent a product consisting of a substance or 
composition being treated as capable of industrial application merely 
because it is invented for use in any such method.
Pharmaceuticals are the most obvious and important example of such 
                                                          
9Tectronics/Pacemaker [1996] OJ EPO 274.
10 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Baker Norton [2001] RPC 1 and Instituo Gentili SpA v Teva Pharaceutical 
Industries Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1545.
11 Unilever’s (Davis’) Application [1983] RPC 219.
12 See Thums, D, ‘Patent Protection for Medical Treatment: A Distinction between Patent and Medical 
Law’ (1996) 27 IIC 423.
13 European Patent Office Guidelines Pt C, ch 4.3.
14 Case T-144/83 Du Pont/Appetite Suppressant [1987] EPOR 6. Note, however, the European Patent 
Office guidelines define ‘surgery’ to include plastic surgery, so such methods would also be excluded 
from protection.
15 Schering’s Application [1971] RPC 337.
16 Stafford-Miller’s Application [1984] FSR 258.
17 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals [2001] RPC 1, 17.
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patentable products. The inclusion of this provision is entirely due to the 
lobbying power of the pharmaceutical industry and its insistence on the need 
for strong patent protection to maintain the incentive to develop an ever-
burgeoning range of drugs. The threat that innovation will dry up if patent 
protection is not available is a powerful argument which is used across a range 
of industries that avail themselves of the benefits of the patent system, but 
nowhere is that threat more effective than in the realm of pharmaceuticals. 
Although there is precious little empirical evidence that the denial of a patent 
has a disproportionately negative effect on innovation, the cost is thought to be 
too great to challenge the fixity of the pharmaceutical sector.
17.07 Some European countries such as Spain and Italy traditionally denied patent 
protection to pharmaceuticals for reasons similar to those that underpin the 
exclusion of methods of treatment. Eventually, however, these states bowed to 
international pressure and commitments to the European Union and brought 
their laws in line with other western states. And, while a number of developing 
and least developed countries continue to exclude patent protection in this 
field, their membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and attendant 
obligations under the international TRIPS Agreement (1994) mean that this 
will soon change. In particular, TRIPS requires that: ‘… patents shall be 
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology…’.18 Least developed Countries have until 2016 to provide patent 
protection for pharmaceutical inventions.
17.08 Further restriction on the impact of s 4(2) of the 1977 Act comes in the form 
of s 2(6) of the Act. This provides:
In the case of an invention consisting of a substance or composition for use 
in a method of treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or 
therapy or of diagnosis practised on the human or animal body, the fact 
that the substance or composition forms part of the state of the art shall not 
prevent the invention from being taken to be new if the use of the 
substance or composition in any such method does not form part of the 
state of the art.
Put simply, this provision ensures the patentability of a second, or even 
subsequent, medical use of a substance already employed in treatment or 
diagnosis. While the new use must be previously unknown for it to be 
patentable, it is irrelevant that a method of treatment is involved, or that the 
substance is already known and is being used (albeit to a different end), or 
indeed that the substance is manufactured in precisely the same way for the 
old and new uses.19 An example is Wyeth’s Application 20 in which the use of 
pharmaceutical compounds known as guanidines, which had been primarily 
used to lower blood pressure, was held to be patentable when employed in the 
manufacture of anti-diarrhoeal agents. The important qualification on claims 
to second or subsequent medical use is that these must be drafted in such a 
way as to be limited to the manufacture of the medicament to be used in 
                                                          
18 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994, Art 27(1). Note that Art 
27(3) allows signatory states to exclude from patentability ‘diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment of humans and animals’, while Art 27(2) permits exclusions from 
patentability of inventions ‘… the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre 
public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health…’.
19 Eisai/Second Medical Indication Decision G 0005/83 [1985] OJ EPO 64.
20 Wyeth’s Application; Schering’s Application [1985] RPC 545.
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human treatment. Thus, it was not possible in Wyeth to claim ‘the use of 
guanidine in treating diarrhoea’ because this was tantamount to a claim to a 
method of treatment. Rather, the successful wording of the claim was to ‘the 
use of a guanidine in the preparation of an anti-diarrhoeal agent for treating or
preventing diarrhoea’. The distinction, albeit very fine, is carefully drawn by 
the courts in their interpretation of patent claims. For example, the Court of 
Appeal recently rejected a claim for the use of taxol in cancer treatment 
whereby the claimants had discovered that a change of treatment regime by 
controlled infusion of taxol in three-hour rather than 24-hour periods could 
produce a similar therapeutic benefit with less suppression of the white cells of 
the blood. The inclusion of a claim ‘… for manufacturing a medicamentation 
for simultaneous, separate, or sequential application…’ did not change the 
essential feature of the invention; it was merely a method of treatment of the 
human body.21
17.0 This example aside, the general trend in contemporary patent law is to 
interpret patentability exclusions very restrictively. Indeed, the exclusion of 
methods of treatment and diagnosis in European patent law is now something 
of an anomaly. Not only has its scope been progressively reduced over the 
years, but its underlying logic is difficult to reconcile with other patenting 
practices around the globe. For example, there is no such exclusion in the 
United States and other jurisdictions have abandoned the provision as being no 
longer defensible.22 That having been said, there are no current plans to do 
away with the exclusion in Europe, but its impact remains marginal in the 
patenting of new medical technologies.
C. Biotechnological Inventions
17.10 The most controversial field of patenting in recent years is that relating to 
biotechnological inventions. These are inventions involving biological 
material, that is, ‘any material containing genetic information and capable of 
reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system’.23 Put another 
way, these inventions embody, or are derived from, material taken from living 
organisms, be these from the plant, animal or human kingdoms. A number of 
objections have been raised to the application of patent law in this realm. 
These have often been confused and conflated under the emotive term 
‘patenting life’, the use of which is unhelpful and, for the most part, has served 
only to muddy the waters. Rather, the objections should be treated and 
assessed according to their aims, of which there are broadly two. First, 
absolute grounds of objection have been raised to exclude these inventions 
from patent protection because it is argued either (i) they do not meet the 
criteria for patentability and/or (ii) they are prohibited by the exceptions in 
patent law itself. Second, relative grounds of objection have been raised 
challenging the effects of a biotechnological patent either because of (i) the 
breadth of the monopoly that has been granted, and/or (ii) the ways in which 
the invention is exploited under patent law. We shall consider each of these 
objections in turn.
                                                          
21 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals [2001] RPC 1.
22 See, eg, Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 141 (Aus) and Cuthbert, D, 
‘Patent Law Reform in New Zealand: Should Methods of Medical Treatment be Patentable?’ (1997) 
Patent World May 32.
23 Directive (EC) 98/44 of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ 
L213/13, Art 2(1)(a).
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1. Absolute Grounds for Objection
(i) Discoveries
17.11 As has been already stated, the philosophy of the patent system requires that 
an invention is new, which means that it should not already be part of the state 
of the art (ie, available to the public by any means).24 Furthermore, every 
patent system excludes discoveries from patentable subject matter.25 The 
reasoning is self-evident: why should one party enjoy the reward of a powerful 
monopoly for something which she did not invent and which, in theory at 
least, is available to all? How, then, it is frequently asked, can naturally-
occurring entities such as genes or partial gene sequences form part of a 
patentable invention? Why is this not merely discovery rather than invention? 
The answer emerges from the interpretation of patent terminology.
17.12 A discovery is the simple uncovering of a previously unrecognised substance 
or of a new property of a known substance. An invention is the production of a 
technical solution to a previously unsolved technical problem. It is of crucial 
importance to appreciate that the prohibition on discoveries relates only to 
discoveries as such.26 This means that, while the mere discovery itself—for 
example, the discovery of the base pair sequence of a gene—cannot be the 
subject of a patent, applications or uses of the discovery may be patentable. 
And, because patent exclusions are interpreted restrictively, a discovery that 
can be put to use to solve a technical problem will overcome the prohibition 
and may itself be patentable.27 Thus, locating a previously unknown gene, 
determining its function and making it accessible for further exploitation is an 
example of a technical solution to the pre-existing problem of the 
inaccessibility of the genetic product.28 The inventiveness that is rewarded is 
the making available of something that was previously beyond our reach. 
However, any patent granted only allows control of the invention in a 
commercial context. It does not extend to copies of the genetic material in a 
natural environment, for example, within human beings.
17.13 The essential character of the invention is irrelevant so long as it produces a 
technical effect in solving a problem. Indeed, the European Patent Office 
Guidelines direct examiners to consider the invention as a whole and ‘to 
identify the real contribution which the subject-matter… adds to the known 
art’.29
17.14 The European Directive on the protection of biotechnological inventions 
confirms that while patents are not available for ‘the human body or its parts 
in their natural state or for the simple discovery of one of its elements’ (Article 
5(1)), patents are available for ‘elements that are isolated from the human 
body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene, even if the structure of that element is 
identical to that of a natural element’ (Article 5(2)).30 These fine distinctions 
have not proved un-controversial. The French Government, for example, has 
                                                          
24 Patents Act 1977, s 1(1)(a).
25 In the UK, see ibid, s 1(2)(a).
26 ibid, s 1(2).
27 European Patent Office Guidelines Pt C, ch IV, 2a.
28 See eg Icos Decision OJ EPO 6/2002 293 in which it was held that the production of a purified and 
isolated nucleic acid having a sequence that does not exist in nature is not a discovery (although note 
this patent failed on other grounds including lack of inventive step and lack of industrial applicability).
29 European Patent Office Guidelines Pt C, ch I V, 2.
30 N 23 above, Art 5.
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refused to implement the full terms of the Directive arguing that Article 5(1) 
and 5(2) contradict each other. The Government is still negotiating with the 
European Commission over implementation. It is not alone in its concerns. By 
December 2002 only six Member States had implemented the Directive, some 
two and a half years after the deadline. The Commission formally requested 
the remaining nine States to implement the law or face the prospect of being 
taken to the European Court of Justice;31 this occurred in July 2003 when eight 
States were so referred for non-implementation.32 A Group of Experts has 
been established to monitor and to advise on biotechnology and patenting in 
Europe, as was required by the Directive itself.33 A Europe-wide public 
consultation34 has shown that numerous points of conflict remain over the 
application of patent law in this field and many respondents are uneasy about 
the practice. Of most concern are the levels of protection given to patents of 
sequences or partial sequences of human genes and the patentability of human 
stem cells and cell lines derived from them. The Expert Group’s first tasks are 
to examine these areas. The European Parliament, for its part, issued a 
resolution on the Commission’s communication in November 2002 in which it 
stressed its support for greater public engagement with the issues surrounding 
biotechnology, including its protection by legal means.35 In particular, the 
Parliament urged the Commission to revisit the text of the Directive, and 
especially Article 5(2), so as to exclude the total or partial sequence of a gene 
isolated from the body from patentability. The debate, therefore, is far from 
over. However, the response is monotonously repetitive from the economic 
perspective. It is argued that the proposed exclusions will not promote 
research and development activity in Europe and will put European 
biotechnology businesses at a competitive disadvantage because other 
jurisdictions, such as the United States and Japan, do not have these exclusions 
in their patent law.36
(ii) Morality
(a) In General
17.15 In contrast to the approach adopted in the United States and in many other 
jurisdictions, European patent law has long contemplated a role for moral 
considerations in the decision-making process on the grant of patents.37 The 
                                                          
31 European Commission Communication, ‘Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: 
Commission Discusses Progress with Member States and Establishes Expert Group’, 28 January 2003, 
IP/03/127.
32 IP/03/911, 10 July 2003.
33 This Group reported for the first time in October 2002. In essence, the Group reiterated the need, as it 
saw it, to maintain competitiveness through full and proper implementation of the Directive, lest 
Europe lose out on the enormous potential of the biotechnology market (http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/invent/com02-2en.pdf ).
34 For the results of the public consultation see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/biotechnology/pdf/results_en.pdf.
35 For the provisional edition of the text see www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar? 
APP=PDF&TYPE=PV2&FILE=p0021121EN. pdf&LANGUE=EN.
36 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Development and 
Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, COM (2002) 545 
final, 7 October 2002.
37 See also Art 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement (1994) which permits, but does not require, signatory 
countries to include morality exceptions in their patent law in similar terms to those found in the EPC. 
In the UK s 1(3) of the Patents Act 1977 provides that: ‘A patent shall not be granted for an invention 
the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to public policy or morality’.
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European Patent Convention embodies the common fundamentals of patent 
law in 27 European states, including the United Kingdom.38 Article 53 
provides that:
European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary 
to ordre public or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be 
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or 
regulation in some or all of the Contracting States;
These provisions lay more or less dormant in the Convention until the advent 
of biotechnological patents whereupon objectors seized the opportunity to 
challenge the patentability of these inventions. Without exception, their efforts 
have been fruitless. The first problem was to persuade the patent examiners in 
the European Patent Office that considerations of morality were within their 
sphere of responsibility and competence. The issue first arose in 
Harvard/Oncomouse 39 in which the European Patent Office upheld a patent 
on a transgenic mouse bred to develop cancer as a research tool. The European 
Patent Office relied on the strictly utilitarian analysis that the potential benefit 
to mankind outweighed the suffering of the animal, and accordingly there was 
no bar to patent protection. Proceedings were immediately instituted against 
the ruling which remained unresolved for a decade, during which time the 
patent remained in force. A solution was eventually found in 2001 when the 
scope of the patent was restricted to ‘transgenic rodents containing an 
additional cancer gene’ rather than ‘any non-human transgenic mammal’.40
Harvard/Oncomouse is significant because it established the precedent for 
future challenges on grounds of morality. Its crude felicific calculus has been 
adopted and refined in other cases, and always in the vein of interpreting the 
morality exclusion narrowly. Thus, for example, in Plant Genetic 
Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors,41 the European Patent Office stated 
that it was only prepared to entertain challenges on grounds of morality if 
actual evidence of harm to society could be demonstrated. Moreover, survey 
evidence and opinion polls indicating distaste for patents over genetically 
modified organisms were insufficient evidence by which to judge the overall 
European moral tone. In Howard Florey/H2 Relaxin 42 the Office declared that 
the morality measure should be applied to prevent the grant of patents only in 
the case of inventions which would universally be regarded as outrageous. 
Accordingly, it upheld the grant of a patent over a genetically engineered 
human protein, H2 relaxin, which is produced by women during childbirth to 
soften the pelvis. The patent had been objected to on a number of grounds. 
First, that the granting of the patent was tantamount to slavery of women 
because it involved the ‘dismemberment of women and the sale of their parts’; 
second, that it was offensive to human dignity to use pregnant women for 
profit; and finally that, because DNA was life itself, patenting of human DNA 
                                                          
38 Membership as at November 2003.
39 HARVARD/Oncomouse [1991] EPOR 525.
40 By way of contrast the Supreme Court of Canada revoked the Harvard patent over Oncomouse itself 
(but not the process to manufacture it) in December 2002, claiming that, ‘[a] higher life form is not 
patentable because it is not a “manufacture” or “composition of matter”’: see Harvard College v 
Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [2002] SCJ No 77. This ruling cannot now be changed except by 
express legislation.
41 Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors [1995] EPOR 357.
42 Howard Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541.
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was intrinsically immoral.43 The Office rejected each of these claims on a 
narrow construction of the morality exclusion. DNA, it said, is not life, nor 
was the taking and modification of samples anything approximating to 
slavery. Importantly, the European Patent Office placed considerable store in 
the fact that consent had been obtained from the women to take the samples 
from which the patentable subject matter was derived. This, in itself, was 
thought to be enough to accord respect to human dignity. Interestingly, 
however, it is not clear what the women consented to, and in particular 
whether they were ever told of the prospect of patents being granted over 
material derived from them and the consequent economic potential.44
(b) Consent to Patenting
17.16 This issue of consent also arose in the negotiations on the draft of the 
Biotechnology Directive. Initial proposals required that specific consent to 
patenting be obtained from individuals who provided samples that might lead 
to the manufacture of patentable products, but, after much lobbying from 
industry and the research community, no such measure appears in the body of 
the Directive. However, recitals in the preamble to a Directive exist as aids to 
interpretation of the Articles contained therein and Recital 26 of the 
Biotechnology Directive provides:
Whereas if an invention is based on biological material of human origin or 
if it uses such material, where a patent application is filed, the person from 
whose body the material is taken must have had an opportunity of 
expressing free and informed consent thereto, in accordance with national 
law…
While the legal status of recitals is unclear,45 as is, in particular, whether they 
have the force of law in Member States, the UK implementing regulations 
contain nothing on this requirement for consent.46 Moreover, the recital itself 
is opaque as to what consent should relate to: is it the taking of the material or 
the filing of the patent application? The former is merely a reflection of sound 
ethical research practice, while the latter is a potentially more onerous 
requirement, not only for the researcher who obtains consent, but also for the 
patentee (who will not necessarily be the same person). Indeed, the patent 
office itself could feel the weight of such a provision—upon whom should the 
onus lie to ensure the provision is complied with, and what sanction, if any, 
will apply if it is not? The Directive is silent on the matter, but the burden of 
examination for patent offices could be considerable if this became a ground 
on which to challenge the validity of a patent. None the less, it is the opinion 
of the European Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of 
Biotechnology that, when someone contributes a biological element that might 
later be included in an invention, then information disclosure must be 
‘complete and specific’ for the consent to be valid. In particular, there must be 
information ‘on the potential patent application on the invention which could 
be made from the use of this element’.47 The Group further opines that a
                                                          
43 ibid.
44 See further Moore v Regents of the University of California (n 49 below).
45 Case C-162/97 Criminal proceedings against Nilsson, Hagelgren and Arrborn [1998] ECR I-07477.
46 The Patents Regulations 2000, SI 2000/2037.
47 European Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology, Ethical Aspects of 
Patenting Inventions Involving Elements of Human Origin, Opinion No 8, 25 September 1996, para 
2.4. This body was succeed by the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies which 
reiterated this position in its Opinion No 16 of 17 May 2002 on Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions 
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patent should be refused if there is evidence of disrespect for individual rights 
or human dignity.48 At the time of writing the Danish Government is 
contemplating making consent to patenting a requirement of their law and its 
efforts will doubtless be keenly observed around the Union.
17.17 Consent and patenting have been considered together in one other famous 
instance, this time from across the Atlantic. In Moore v Regents of the 
University of California 49 the plaintiff failed in his attempt to claim property 
rights in his excised spleen cells from which his doctor and other researchers 
had profited after developing and patenting a cell-line using those cells. The 
court pointed to the hindrance to research that recognition of property rights in 
such material could create, and preferred instead to grant Moore remedies for 
lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty. The court concluded 
that: ‘(1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s 
health, whether research or economic, that may affect the physician’s 
professional judgment; and (2) a physician’s failure to disclose such interests 
may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical procedures without 
informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty’.50 While this is not tantamount 
to requiring a disclosure of an intent to patent per se, the reference to 
economic interests indicates that it would be sound practice to alert patients at 
least to the prospect. This is particularly so when ‘[t]he scope of the 
physician’s communication to the patient … must be measured by the 
patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the 
decision’.51 It is important to note, too, that there was no question of the court 
in Moore revoking the patent over the cell-line. It was held to be both ‘legally 
and factually distinct’ from the cells taken from the plaintiff’s body and the 
resultant financial gain was a valid reward for the inventive effort of the 
researchers. Thus, not only was Moore denied the recognition of property 
rights in his own cells but he was also deprived of the opportunity to ensure 
that other forms of property right did not pass to other parties.
17.18 Similar arguments have arisen more recently in Greenberg v Miami Children’s 
Hospital Research Institute Inc. This was a class action by families of 
sufferers of Canavan’s disease, a rare genetic disorder, brought against the 
researchers and the hospital who patented the Canavan disease gene after 
carrying out extensive research on samples and information provided by the 
families. Inter alia, arguments were advanced in conversion, lack of informed 
consent and breach of fiduciary duty. A motion at the behest of the defendants 
to strike out the action was refused, but the grounds for complaint were 
reduced to the unjust enrichment of the defendants at the expense of the 
plaintiffs,52 and the case subsequently settled out of court. Nonetheless, the 
overarching aim throughout the proceedings had been to obtain an injunction 
to prevent the defendants relying on the patent. It is to be regretted that a full 
judicial hearing did not materialise because there were always are at least two 
reasons to suspect that the case would not blindly follow the precedent in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Involving Human Stem Cells, para 2.6.
48 ibid, para 2.1.
49 Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal 3d 120.
50 ibid, 129.
51 Cobbs v Grant (1972) 8 Cal 3d 229, 245.
52 Gorner, P, ‘Court Allows Suit on Use of Dead Kids’ DNA for Patent’, The Chicago Tribune, 8 June 
2003, (www.chicagotribune.com).
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Moore. First, the suit was being heard in Florida, whereas Moore is only 
binding authority in California. The tendency to assume that Moore 
encapsulates a universal precedent is, of course, erroneous. Second, the policy 
arguments are not as clear-cut as the Supreme Court of California suggested 
over a decade ago. Its concern, then, was to avoid erecting barriers to research 
and to ensure the development of, and on-going access to, medicines. The 
Greenberg case was representative of a groundswell of opinion against the use 
of patents in the medical sphere when these are used to block research by 
others or to limit access to health care. The owners of the Canavan patent, for 
example, charged a fixed royalty of $12.50 per test and placed a limit on the 
number of tests that could be carried out annually by any licensee. Research 
uses were also tightly controlled through licensing. The plaintiffs in Greenberg 
were challenging the patent precisely because of these practices and not for 
personal profit. They did so to ensure that further research is carried out and,
in this sense, the policy arguments in Moore are turned on their heads.
(c) The European Directive
17.19 The European Directive imposes certain limitations on patenting, namely that 
‘[i]nventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial 
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality’.53 While morality 
is left undefined, specific exclusions are applied to the patenting of processes 
for cloning human beings or modifying the human germ-line, to uses of 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and to any processes 
for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal. The last 
example is a modification of the test laid down in Harvard/Oncomouse. The 
list is non-exhaustive and represents the few, most contentious, issues that all 
concerned could agree upon at the time of the adoption of the Directive. In so 
doing, it was hoped that the moral objectors would be placated while, at the 
same time, legislation would be passed that permitted patenting in all but a 
few narrowly defined realms.
17.20 The debate about the scope of the morality provisions nonetheless rumbles on. 
Although Article 6 excludes uses of human embryos from patenting, it says 
nothing about cells derived from embryos. Nor is it clear whether the 
prohibition on processes for cloning human beings relates only to reproductive 
cloning techniques or extends to cloning to produce stem cells for therapeutic 
purposes. The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
reported that by 2002 over 2000 patent applications had been lodged around 
the world involving both human and non-human stem cells; a quarter of which 
related to embryonic stem cells. Over a third of all stem cell applications had 
been granted, as had a quarter of those related to embryonic stem cells.54 One 
of the most controversial of these applications was the so-called ‘Edinburgh 
Patent’ which was originally granted by the European Patent Office over 
‘animal transgenic stem cells’. However, this raised considerable concern 
when it was suggested that this might lead to human cloning. In opposition 
proceedings before the Office in July 2002, however, the patent was amended 
to exclude human or animal embryonic cells, although it still covers modified 
human and animal stem cells, and the patent was upheld on this basis. The 
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European Parliament has pointed to the decision and requested Member States 
to recognise that this demonstrates that the Office can, and does, show due 
concern and respect for the ethical dimensions of patenting.55 The European 
Group on Ethics, for its part, has urged a cautious approach and recommended 
‘excluding the patentability of the process of creation of a human embryo by 
cloning for stem cells’.56
17.21 It is clear, then, that despite the adoption of the Directive and the favourable 
rulings of the European Patent Office, the presence of a morality clause in 
European patent law has remained problematic for the biotechnology industry. 
Objections to the Directive based on moral grounds were primarily responsible 
for the delay in adopting the legislation, a process that took ten years. Even 
after its eventual adoption in July 1998, the Directive was challenged by the 
Netherlands, Italy and Norway before the European Court of Justice. The 
court took until October 2001 to uphold the validity of the law,57 but as has 
been stated, a number of Member States have still to implement the Directive, 
some on the basis that moral objections remain.
17.22 The irony is that many of these objections are misguided in their aims and can 
never achieve what they seek. It must be borne in mind that the sole purpose 
of the patent system is to grant private rights to facilitate the public 
exploitation of inventions through monopoly control of the market. That is, a 
patent only gives the right to exclude others from the marketplace. The only 
effect of a successful challenge to a patent is the denial of this market 
advantage. Anyone is then at liberty to produce and exploit the invention. 
Those who object to patenting because they object to the invention itself 
therefore cannot hope to prevent the creative or exploitative process by this 
means. The only hope is that the absence of patent protection might act as a 
disincentive to invent, but there are many examples of industrial developments 
that never qualify for patent protection and yet are not hindered by this fact. 
The problem stems from a misguided desire to use the patent system as a tool 
for the regulation of science, industry and medicine.58 To say that the system 
is ill-equipped for the task is an understatement of considerable proportions.59
(iii) Interpretation
17.23 The most effective measures to reduce the impact of biotechnological patents 
have arisen in the interpretation of the criteria for patentability themselves, ie, 
in the need to show that an invention is new, involves an inventive step and is 
capable of industrial application. We have already considered the meaning of 
novelty in the biotechnology context and noted the vulnerability of a patent at 
any time in its life to challenge on the grounds of lack of novelty. The 
requirement of an inventive step ensures that protection is only granted when 
                                                          
55 European Parliament resolution on the Commission communication on life sciences and 
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56 N 54 above, para 2.5. For further discussion of patenting practices relating to stem cells see Laurie, 
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59 In LELAND STANFORD/Modified Animal [2002] EPOR 2 the European Patent Office confirmed the 
validity of a patent for an immuno-compromised chimera mouse on the grounds that the controversial 
nature of the technology was insufficient on its own to deny a patent.
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the invention represents a sufficiently significant advance in the field. The test 
asks whether the invention would be obvious to an expert who is apprised of 
the current state of the art and who compares what was already known to what 
has been invented. Thus, in Genentech Inc’s Patent60 the Court of Appeal 
considered the validity of Genentech’s patent for human tissue plasminogen 
activator (t-PA)—a naturally occurring human protein that plays a role in the 
dissolution of blood clots. Genentech applied relatively standard genetic 
engineering techniques to reproduce sufficiently pure amounts of t-PA to 
develop a therapeutic agent. However, at least five other teams had embarked 
on the same task applying more or less the same techniques and the patent was 
subsequently challenged for lack of the inventive step. The Court revoked the 
patent holding that it was obvious to a person skilled in the art to set out to 
produce human t-PA by these means. The court was at pains to point out that 
being first, or expending considerable sums in the process of development, 
were not necessarily indications of inventiveness. The industry later showed 
concern that the decision might have raised the standard for inventiveness in 
the realm of biotechnological inventions. This was because the Court 
considered that the expert who assesses inventiveness in such industries can 
possess a degree of imagination and ingenuity, and that collaborative efforts 
within a team can also be used to assess the criterion. Normally the notional 
expert test contemplates an ordinarily skilled but unimaginative person. This 
having been said, there is no significant evidence that subsequent 
biotechnological patents have been subjected to a higher threshold.
2. Relative Grounds of Objection
(i) Morality of Monopoly
17.24 While it is possible to challenge the grant of a patent per se, an equally 
credible option is to challenge the grant of a market monopoly over 
inventions. The basis of this objection is that the abusive exercise of the 
private property right would undermine certain valued public interests. Access 
to medicines and diagnostic tools and the pursuit of medical research are 
undeniable public goods, while the control of drug and therapeutics markets 
and the impact on research are equally axiomatic concerns that are raised by 
the grant of pharmaceutical and biotechnological patents. The scene is set, 
then, for a classic conflict scenario. No example illustrates the problem better 
than the case of Myriad Genetics which owns patents worldwide over the 
breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 and which are the subject of
opposition proceedings before the European Patent Office. As the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics states:
The opposition is aimed at curtailing any possible deleterious 
consequences which might stem from sanctioning the monopoly conferred 
on Myriad Genetics, including the possible threat to the development of 
research and the identification of new tests and diagnostic methods. It has 
also been argued that the patent will have a serious impact on equitable 
access to testing. It is suggested that the monopoly is antithetical to an 
approach to public health that is based on a commitment to the 
comprehensive care of patients at high-risk.61
17.25 Moreover, and as the Council goes on to point out, because of the way in 
which Myriad Genetics has used its patent monopolies world-wide, ‘there are 
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currently no other methods of diagnosing the presence of the breast cancer 
susceptibility gene BRCA1 that can be used without infringing the patents’.62
17.26 A European Parliament resolution from October 2001 called upon the 
European Patent Office to reconsider the grant of patents and for amendment 
to the European Patent Convention which would allow the Office to revoke 
patents on its own initiative.63 The Office replied by pointing to the role of 
opposition proceedings, which in Europe can be invoked by any party with a 
valid concern about a patent. It also stressed that its policy was not to make a 
special case of biotechnological inventions.64 Certainly, the concern over 
monopolistic control is not restricted to these kinds of invention, and 
pharmaceutical patents are open to precisely the same grounds of objection. 
The dilemma for the Patent Office and the state in whose name patents are 
granted is to strike a balance between encouraging sufficient investment and 
research through the availability of patent protection while not being seen to 
prejudice, and so dissuade, patentees by setting the qualifying criteria too high. 
An additional problem is that wholesale challenges that go to the heart of the 
patent only offer an all or nothing option: either the patent stands or it does 
not. Other strategies are, however, available which leave more scope for 
balance.
(a) Balanced Court Rulings
17.27 The ruling of the House of Lords in Biogen v Medeva 65 is a good example of 
a search for the middle ground. This case confirmed that there is no need to 
prove an ‘invention’ in the biotechnology sphere beyond satisfying the criteria 
of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability. This additional criterion 
had been suggested in Genentech, but the House of Lords stated categorically 
that to meet the basic patentability criteria is to define a patentable invention. 
Indeed, the general tenor of this decision is to the effect that no special case 
should be made of biotechnological patents, thus sharing the clear policy 
position of the European Patent Office. However, the court did strike down the 
patent on a number of technical grounds, inter alia, because the claimed 
monopoly was far in excess of what the invention actually contributed to the
state of the art. Essentially, the House of Lords took a very measured approach 
in Biogen and sent the clear message that the criterion of inventiveness should 
only reward actual technical contributions to human knowledge—no more and 
no less. It is a frequent problem with new and emerging technologies that 
initial grants are pleaded broadly before the patent offices and it is left to the 
courts to get to grips with the true nature of the technology. Biogen was an 
early attempt to keep the United Kingdom on a straight and narrow path.
17.28 Most recently, the Court of Appeal upheld the validity of a patent over 
genetically engineered Erythropoietin (EPO)—a protein found in minute 
levels in the body which regulates the production of red blood cells—while at 
the same time ruling out the infringement claim of the patent holders.66 The 
Court allowed a broad claim to the DNA sequence for EPO as well as to 
variants that performed the same function on the basis that the defendants 
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64 European Patent Office Declaration of 17 October 2001, AC/145/01.
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could not show that the variants did not work. By the same token, the Court 
adopted a less abstracted interpretation of how the defendants’ invention 
worked compared to the court of first instance and found sufficient differences 
with the patent in suit to hold that there had been no infringement. In many 
respects the decision is a good example of the balance of interests that is so 
crucial to the operation of a sound and socially useful patent system. It is, 
however, due for appeal to the House of Lords at the time of writing.
17.29 The careful policing of the boundaries of the tests for patentability is now a 
clear policy objective advocated in many quarters. The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, for example, has called for more stringent assessments of all 
criteria, and most especially the need to demonstrate inventive step.67 The 
Council suspects that significant numbers of patents have been granted over 
biotechnological inventions that do not meet the full rigours of the test. The 
Council also draws attention to subtle, yet significant, differences in 
interpretation between the patent offices of Europe and the United States 
which lead to the conclusion that a lower threshold is applied in the United 
States, thus making biotechnology patenting easier. In both economic areas, 
however, revised guidance has been produced on the third criterion for 
patentability with special reference to genetic inventions. A biotechnological 
invention in the United States must now demonstrate a ‘specific and 
substantial and credible utility’, ie, it must have a clear function, although this 
can include a sufficiently defined theoretical use.68 The European Directive of 
1998 states that full or partial gene sequences with no known function will not 
be patentable,69 and this has been confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice70 and the European Patent Office which has held that the mere 
speculative function for a genetically engineered gene sequence is no 
demonstration that the product is capable of industrial application.71 Such a 
restrictive policy is perfectly sensible and clear: when one considers the 
plethora of such inventions that occur; a corresponding number of indistinct 
and unknowable monopolies is clearly not in the public interest.
(b) Further Limits on Monopolies
17.30 A recent report from the European Commission points to a possible role for
compulsory licences in the biotechnological sector.72 A compulsory licence 
can be sought by an outside party if a patent holder refuses to grant licences 
for use on reasonable terms and when the patentee is not exploiting the 
invention herself. Compulsory licences exist, in theory at least, to ensure 
public availability of new inventions and they are granted when the patentee is 
not upholding her side of the bargain with the state. At the domestic level, the 
relevant patent office will decide the terms of the licence in negotiation with 
the parties and the patentee is entitled to ‘reasonable remuneration’.73 The 
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Commission also stresses the importance of the principle of exempting prior 
use whereby anyone already using an invention prior to the patent application, 
or who had made ‘effective and serious preparations for such use’, can 
continue in that use.74 What the report does not highlight is the considerable 
antipathy with which compulsory licensing is viewed, both by patentees and 
patent offices alike. Also, the prior use exemption only allows on-going 
private, ie non-commercial, use and does not in that sense assist competitors.
17.31 It is also worth noting the role of research exemptions in patent law 
worldwide, as a result of which things done on, or to, an invention for purely 
experimental purposes are not considered to be an infringement of the patent. 
There is, for example, a long history of antipathy in the United States towards 
any attempt to limit the private rights of the patent holder. The so-called Bolar 
exemption provides protection for ‘uses reasonably related to the development 
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products’,75 but this 
only extends to measures aimed at obtaining regulatory approval for the rapid 
release of generics onto the market at the expiry of any existing patent. 
Furthermore, the scope of the common law research exemption—which as its 
name suggests allows research to be carried out on a patented invention 
without fear of an infringement suit—has been interpreted progressively more 
restrictively over the years. It received its strictest interpretation to date in the 
Federal Circuit decision on Madey v Duke University 76 where the court 
limited the scope of the exemption ‘strictly to philosophical enquiry only’. In 
particular, the exemption does not apply where the use ‘furthers the 
researcher’s legitimate business’; a concept that the court interpreted widely to
exclude any use if it has the ‘slightest commercial implication’.77 In this 
particular instance, the court held that the status of the defendant as a non-
profit educational institution was not determinative—the research work was 
lucrative for the University in terms of increasing prestige and attracting 
further research monies and future students.
17.32 There is little clarity and no consistency of approach in Europe regarding these 
possible limits to patent monopolies. Bolar exemptions exist in some national 
systems and these are accepted as valuable in principle by the European 
Commission, but a harmonised way forward eludes the Union.78 A research 
exemption also operates across a number of European jurisdictions but in an 
equally disharmonious fashion.79 In particular, and as the Nuffield Council has 
observed: ‘… it is not clear whether the research exemption extends to clinical 
trials. Case law in some countries suggests that it does, in other countries, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ss 51–58.
74 Commission Report (n 72 above), 21.
75 Cf Roche Products, Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co (1984) 733 F2d 858 (CA Fed.) and the Act 
which overturned the ruling to create the ‘Bolar exemption’: the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act 1984 (Waxman-Hatch Act) 21 USC ss301 et seq.
76 Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351 (Fed Cir 2002).
77 Citing Embrex Inc v Service Engineering Corp, 216 F3d 1343 (Fed Cir 2000) at 1353.
78 See, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council laying down Community 
procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Agency for Evaluation of Medicinal Products, COM (2001) 404 final, 26 
November 2001 and Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for human 
use, COM (2003) 163 final, 3 April 2003.
79 See, eg, s60(5)(a) of the UK Patents Act 1977,
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contrary is suggested.’80 Whatever the position in Europe, however, the 
exemption, where it exists, is invariably interpreted more generously than is its 
US counterpart.
A combination of these, and other, approaches is required to ensure a balanced 
and equitable way forward in the future as a host of bodies, reviews and 
reports has concluded.81 Additional factors to be considered include the 
vigilance of patent offices in carrying out thorough searches of the prior art, an 
on-going review of the role for imaginative licensing options, and, as we have 
seen above, careful application of the criteria for patentability. The OECD has 
indicated the difficulty of finding common solutions because of the 
complexity of the area, but it has nevertheless recommended that a multi-
strategy approach should be considered at governmental level requiring, inter 
alia, review of the policies within the IP system itself, the manner by which 
patents are administered, and changing the behaviour of patentees in the way 
they exploit their monopolies.82 The Organisation notes in particular that the 
role of compulsory licences, although not popular to date, should be 
revisited.83
D. Access to Medicines: The International Dimension
17.33 It has already been suggested that the impact of compulsory licensing schemes 
has been marginal in the health sector. Nonetheless, there is growing support 
for their use as a fair and reasonable restriction on the effects of patent 
monopoly control. Arguments in this respect are most advanced, although as 
yet not especially effective, at the international level.
The DOHA Declaration of November 2001, issued by the Council of 
Ministers of the World Trade Organisation, is designed to address some of the 
issues arising from the existence and exercise of IPRs as these relate to public 
health. The Declaration stresses the importance of interpreting and 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement84 in ways that both promote access to 
existing medicines and encourage the creation of new medicines.85 The 
primary effects of the Declaration, and a separate Declaration on public 
health,86 make it incumbent on the TRIPS Council to address the use of 
compulsory licences by developing countries in the pharmaceutical realm, and 
to extend the deadline for least-developed countries to provide pharmaceutical 
patent protection under the TRIPS Agreement until 1 January 2016.87 DOHA 
reiterates the underlying principle of Article 8 of TRIPS that ‘members may 
… adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition …’. Thus, 
para 4 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health provides 
that:
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We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, 
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that 
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
Such measures include restricting patentability or imposing conditions on the 
use of a patent, for example, by permitting compulsory licences to be granted. 
However, attempts to rely on these provisions88 have met with vigorous 
opposition from pharmaceutical companies in some states, and most notably in 
the United States. This in turn led to a further round of negotiations between 
members of the World Trade Organisation as to the precise meaning of Article 
8 TRIPS and para 4 of DOHA. When, for example, are measures necessary to 
protect public health? Who should decide this? And, how far can a state go to 
promote access to medicines for all?
17.34 The problem is particularly acute for developing and least developed 
countries, as is recognised by para 6 of the Declaration on Public Health:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.
The stumbling block in this regard has been Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement which provides that production under compulsory licence must be 
predominantly for the domestic market. How, then, can drugs be produced in 
developing countries—even with the exemption of compulsory licence 
protection—if those countries do not possess the infrastructure to manufacture 
such drugs? Moreover, how can other states assist if their own generics 
production should be limited to their own market?
17.35 The TRIPS Council was given the difficult task of finding an equitable 
solution to this problem before the end of 2002. This did not happen. 
Negotiations reached stalemate when the United States emerged as the sole 
country to reject an EU proposal to amend TRIPS so as to allow members to 
grant compulsory licences for the export of medicines to countries that do not 
have any substantial manufacturing capacity of their own.89 The United States 
objected to the fact that developing countries could declare for themselves 
when measures were necessary, and sought to limit the regime only to 
medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. A further 
suggestion from the European Union that an extended list of 22 diseases 
should be introduced, subject to review and extension on the advice of the 
World Health Organisation, was also rejected.90 The debacle demonstrates 
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only too well the range of political agenda that influence and shape intellectual 
property law and policy at all levels, from the global through the regional to 
the local. It highlights too the serious incongruities that arise in the search for 
a fair balance of the interests at stake: economic and moral agenda rarely make 
good bedfellows. Add to the equation a political unwillingness to compromise 
and the prospects for change look bleak.
17.36 This having been said, a compromise was eventually reached on 30 August 
2003. This takes the form of a decision to waive countries’ obligations under 
Article 31(f) of TRIPS and to allow countries producing generics under 
compulsory licence to export to eligible importing countries. This is subject to 
the caveat that it is done in good faith and in the name of public health. 
Notably, there is no longer a need to show an emergency nor is there a list of 
qualifying diseases. It should also be pointed out, however, that 23 countries 
immediately declared that they would not allow importation under the waiver 
in what is little more than a thinly veiled act of protectionism. These include 
the United States, Canada, Europe, Australia and Japan. The measure has been 
hailed as an equitable solution to the global problem of access to medicines, 
but in other ways it merely widens the gap between the West and the Rest. 
While western companies continue to tighten their grip over their domestic 
markets, new markets are simultaneously opened up to them with no means to 
influence or control the prices of their products. In the absence of measures to 
ensure that generic production takes place, developing countries will have 
precious little option but to trade on terms driven by the intellectual property 
owners, thereby merely accentuating the power imbalance endemic in this 
area.
Footnotes
* I am indebted, as is so often the case, to my colleague Ken Mason for his comments 
on an earlier draft of this contribution. The usual disclaimer applies to my own efforts.
                                                                                                                                                                     
Bangladesh, 31 May–2 June 2003 contains proposals advocating, inter alia, that public health problems 
and the terms of compulsory licences should be the prerogative of least developed countries so long as 
they retain that status.
